Do Female Physicians Capture Their Scarcity Value? The Case of OB/GYNs by Jessica Wolpaw Reyes
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









The author wishes to thank David Autor, David Cutler, Martin Feldstein, Claudia Goldin, Daniel Hammermesh,
Caroline Minter Hoxby, Christopher Jencks, Lawrence Katz, Joseph Newhouse, Justin Wolfers, and
participants in the Harvard Labor and Public Economics Lunch for valuable advice.  Any remaining
errors are my own.  This research was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation,
the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the National Institute on Aging. The views expressed
herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
© 2006 by Jessica Wolpaw Reyes. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.Do Female Physicians Capture Their Scarcity Value? The Case of OB/GYNs
Jessica Wolpaw Reyes




This paper analyzes how the imperfectly competitive market for Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
clears in the face of an excess demand for female OB/GYNs.  This excess demand results from the
convergence of three factors: i) all OB/GYN patients are women, ii) many women prefer to be treated
by a female OB/GYN, iii) only a small portion of OB/GYNs are female.  The paper finds that both
money and non-money prices adjust: female OB/GYNs charge higher fees and also have longer waiting
times.  Furthermore, these effects are mediated by institutional structure: in contract settings in which
money prices are rigid (i.e. managed care), waiting times are more likely to adjust, and in settings
in which money prices are more flexible, the reverse occurs.  In the end, female OB/GYNs are able











  Over the past three decades, the number of female physicians has increased dramatically.  
While women represented only 8% of physicians in 1970, by the year 2000 they represented 
24%.
1  Patient demand for female doctors has also risen over this period: not only do women 
make 40% more visits to doctors each year than men, but more women express a preference for 
women doctors.
2   These increases in demand for female physicians appear to have outpaced 
increases in supply, particularly in certain medical specialties.  This raises the interesting 
question of how the imperfectly competitive market for physicians’ services achieves 
equilibrium in response to this excess demand. 
To investigate this question, I focus on the specialty of Obstetrics and Gynecology 
(OB/GYN) where the excess demand for female physicians is especially pronounced.  On the 
demand side, not only are all OB/GYN patients women, but more and more women prefer to see 
a female physician when discussing matters of a personal and sexual nature (studies indicate that 
more than 50% of women prefer a female physician).
3  On the supply side, only a small portion 
of OB/GYNs are female (22% in 1990).  These factors combine to produce a large excess 
demand for female OB/GYNs.
4  
 If the pricing of doctors' visits was set in an open, competitive market and if the supply 
of doctors was elastic in the medium or long run, then the excess demand for female doctors 
would have two primary effects.  In the short run, the demand shock would raise the price of 
visits to female doctors.  In the medium or long run, the supply of female doctors would increase, 
                                                           
1 American Medical Association. 
2 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997. 
3 Thorne (1994); Chandler et al (2000).  
4 Although the supply of female OB/GYNs has increased, it appears to have been outpaced by increases in demand.  
It is likely that there has always been a latent demand for female OB/GYNs, but that since there was virtually no 
supply this demand was not expressed.  Once the supply of female OB/GYNs rose to non-negligible levels, this 
latent demand may have suddenly been expressed, appearing as an outward demand shock.  The apparent demand      2 
 
 
eliminating any price gaps.  However, healthcare markets are far from competitive, both in the 
short run and the long run.  In the short run, both doctors' fees and the price to patients of a 
doctor's visit are determined by a number of non-competitive factors: physician contracts, 
hospital agreements, insurance payment schedules, and coinsurance rates.  As a result, visits are 
often rationed by mechanisms other than money price: waiting times to get an initial appointment 
or waiting times between appointments are possible non-money prices.   In the long run, the 
supply of doctors in total and in each specialty is far from elastic.  Not only is there a lag of 
nearly eight years in the production of physicians from entry into medical school to the 
completion of a residency, but the Accreditation Council of Graduate Medical Education 
(ACGME) essentially sets the number of residencies available in any single medical specialty.  
Lastly, only a small number of physicians are new each year, so even large adjustments in the 
flow will take many years to significantly alter the stock.  It is doubtful that this market will 
produce the right number of male and female physicians in each specialty.  More generally, it is 
doubtful this market will do a good job providing the appropriate mix of physicians to satisfy 
patient preferences and needs.  Moreover, obstetrics and gynecology, as a surgical sub-specialty, 
has not historically been particularly welcoming to women physicians, and may have presented 
additional barriers that slowed women’s entry.   Overall, both prices and quantities in this market 
will probably be inflexible and/or slow to adjust in both the short run and the long run, and it 
seems unlikely that the competitive equilibrium would be reached.  That is where this 
investigation steps in. 
This paper investigates how the imperfectly competitive market for OB/GYN services 
clears in the short run in the face of the excess demand for female OB/GYNs.  There are many 
possible ways that this excess demand might affect the relative outcomes of female OB/GYNs.  
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It could be reflected in higher fees, longer waiting times, higher incomes, more hours worked, or 
even different health outcomes for patients.
5  The question is of interest for a number of reasons.  
First, the market itself is of interest.  Economic theory provides clear predictions for how non-
price markets may clear, and this situation provides an opportunity to test these predictions.  In 
addition, health care markets themselves are of independent interest, particularly as health care 
institutions experiment with and launch diverse market structures.  This investigation is able to 
study one of these markets – the market for physicians’ services – during a period of great 
change, the advent of managed care in the late 1980s.  The physicians services market itself is 
also of much interest to health economists.  Second, gender discrimination in professional 
occupations, and in medicine in particular, is of independent interest, and this analysis will 
provide insight into the nature of such discrimination. 
I use detailed data on young physicians in the late 1980s and early 1990s to investigate 
these questions.  To preview the results, the paper finds that both money and non-money prices 
adjust: female OB/GYNs charge higher fees and also have longer waiting times.  Furthermore, 
these effects are mediated by institutional structure: in contract settings in which money prices 
are rigid (i.e. managed care), waiting times are more likely to adjust, and in settings in which 
money prices are more flexible, the reverse occurs.  In addition, female OB/GYNs do close the 
gender gap in weekly income significantly, but not completely. 
  The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II discusses background material on female 
physicians, female OB/GYNs, and gender differences.  Section III outlines a simple theoretical 
model for the markets for male and female OB/GYN services.  Section IV sets out the empirical 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
enough to match the demand. 
5 One additional possibility is that other types of female healthcare providers, such as nurse practitioners or 
midwives, may enter the market and provide more female care.  The current analysis does not investigate this 
possibility.      4 
 
 
strategy, and Section V details the empirical results.  Section VI discusses the implications of the 
results, and  Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Background 
A. Many female patients prefer female physicians 
  Much of the medical literature and the popular media appears to assume that female 
patients' preferences for female physicians are so obvious that they do not need to be established.  
There has, however, been some exploration of this assumption.  Among a sample of a military 
population in 1998, 52% of patients said they would prefer a female gynecologist, 4% would 
prefer a male, and for 44% expressed no preference.
6  Among a general sample of the Canadian 
population in 1990, 26% of women said they were more comfortable with a female health 
practitioner (16% with a male), but among younger women 56% reported being more 
comfortable with a female (10% with a male).  Overall, there is significant evidence in the 
medical literature that many female patients prefer to be treated by a female physician, and that 
these preferences are more pronounced in gynecology, psychotherapy, and in areas of sexual 
abuse.  It also appears that these preferences have become stronger over time as gender attitudes 
changed significantly from the 1970s to the 1990s.
7 
  In addition, both patients and doctors confirm that many patients do express a preference 
for being treated by a female OB/GYN.
8  Some patients express a preference for a female 
physician because they believe a woman will provide better care: "A female doctor understands -
blank-."  Some admit that they have no real reason to prefer a female: "My preference for a 
                                                           
6 Chandler et al (2000). 
7 Both a patient’s sex role (Weyrauch (1990)) and her attitude towards the appropriate role of the physician (Elstad 
(1994)) are strongly related to her preference (or not) for a female physician.  As these roles and attitudes change, it 
is likely that patients’ preferences for female physicians will change as well.      5 
 
 
female is more of a quirk. I feel more comfortable confiding my concerns with a woman... This 
isn't the case for other types of physicians."  In fact, 86% of the patients reporting a preference 
for a female doctor in the military sample attribute their preference to a belief that women are 
better able to understand their problems.
9  Many patients argue that feeling comfortable with a 
physician, not the gender of the doctor, is most important.  Lastly, some patients write that they 
had a preference but that it was not confirmed by experience.  Some of these patients report that 
they then changed their preference, while others say they retained it. 
On the other end, male OB/GYNs do report discrimination against them, in the form of 
lower patient demand and lower incomes.  Many young male OB/GYNs are even concerned 
about their employment prospects.  One male physician, who works in a practice group 
consisting of three males and one female, recounts an instance in which a patient "waxed 
rhapsodic" about the emergency treatment she received from one of the male physicians but then 
requested that her follow-up appointment be with the female physician (whom she had never 
met) because she "could never see a male gynecologist."  Interestingly, he concludes that they 
"have chalked it up to a testicle tax."  Another male OB/GYN states that the low number of 
female OB/GYNs, combined with their high demand, causes significant matching problems.
10  In 
addition, one male OB/GYN reports that his wife, also an OB/GYN with nearly identical 
training, "could have commanded a 10% higher salary than I, had we chosen to work for 
someone else, exclusively because she is a woman."  However, he also reports that since 
insurance payments are centrally set, women in private practice are less likely to reap these 
benefits.  Overall, the situation is serious enough that and the American College of Obstetricians 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 The following quotes are excerpted from correspondence circa 1999 in an online OB/GYN forum 
(http://forums.obgyn.net/). These quotes are similar in character to quotes in several articles in the medical literature, 
including Thorne (1994), Haar et al (1975), and Chandler et al (2000). 
9 Chandler et al (2000). 
10 In particular, this physician reports that "everywhere [he has] worked there has been a Muslim community who 
feel strongly that women should see a female doctor" but that this is often impossible.      6 
 
 
and Gynecologists directly acknowledges the mismatch and works hard to encourage men to 
pursue OB/GYN.
11 
Thus, whether or not male and female OB/GYNs actually provide different care, many 
patients think that they do.  Since the good being provided is a personal service, patient 
perception can affect the market valuation of the good: if a patient thinks a female doctor is 
better, she may be willing to pay more to see a female doctor.   In addition, patient perception 
can affect a doctor’s actual productivity: if a patient thinks a female doctor is better, that may 
actually make that doctor better by improving communication, patient satisfaction, and health 
outcomes.   Does this productivity effect legitimate the discrimination?  That is a more difficult 
question.
12  But it remains that patient preference can change market valuation of the good and 
productivity. 
B. Female physicians provide different care 
  There is mixed evidence that female physicians provide quantitatively different care.     
Several studies have concluded that female physicians are both more aware of patients' concerns 
and are more likely to prescribe certain therapies and routine tests, and that female OB/GYNS 
are less likely to perform cesarean sections and hysterectomies. Other studies have found only 
small gender differences.
13  There is some evidence that female physicians provide qualitatively 
different care – that they have a different approach to caring for their patients. Several authors 
find that women physicians appear more able to communicate sensitivity to patients, more able 
                                                           
11 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, in its policy statement “Women’s health care: a career 
in obstetrics & gynecology,” specifically states that “a higher percentage of female obstetrician-gynecologists 
reflects the new balance in medical schools and residency education programs in the United States… However, male 
students should not be discouraged from choosing obstetrics and gynecology as a career; there are numerous 
practice opportunities for competent clinicians of both genders.” 
12 Curtis (2001) argues that the discrimination is unjust and the OB/GYN community should engage in open 
discussion to prevent discrimination against male OB/GYNs and to encourage males to enter the profession.  On the 
other hand, Reddy (2000) reports a legal case in which a male OB/GYN sued for gender discrimination.  The 
appellate court held that patient preference may legitimate accommodation of that preference: “female patients may 
have a legitimate privacy interest in seeking to have female doctors perform their gynecological examinations.”      7 
 
 
to communicate effectively with their patients, and more likely to feel personal responsibility for 
them.
14  On the contrary, other studies have found that male OB/GYNS expressed more concern 
and partnership with their patients, and engaged in more thorough communication.
15 
C. Discrimination against female physicians 
  There is significant evidence for the persistence of discrimination against and sexual 
harassment of female physicians and medical students.  In national surveys and smaller studies, 
more than 50% of female physicians report experiencing discrimination and more than 25% 
report experiencing harassment.
16  Several authors find that women medical school faculty are 
promoted more slowly and that women's lower ranks in the academic hierarchy are not explained 
by productivity or by differential attrition.  Women also face significant obstacles in entering 
surgical and other prestigious specialties, and drop out of medical school at consistently greater 
rates than men.
17  MacLeod reports comments from the Canadian Medical Association workshop 
in which female physicians reported isolation, excessive time demands, and sexism.  
  Thus, the literature confirms that some female patients do prefer to be treated by female 
physicians, female physicians provide quantitatively and qualitatively different care, and female 
physicians experience gender discrimination. 
D. Gender wage differentials in medicine 
  Although medicine is one of the highest paying professions, female physicians have 
historically earned less than their male counterparts even after relevant characteristics (such as 
hours worked, practice setting, and medical specialty) are taken into account.  Raw income gaps 
have barely changed: in 1977 women earned approximately 57% of what men earned, while in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 Mitler et al. (2000); Bickell et al (1994); Ayanian and Guadagnoli (1996); Seto et al. (1996); Ghali (1997); Lurie 
et al. (1997). 
14 Arnold et al. (1988); Kreuter et al (1995). 
15 Roter et al. (1999); van Dulmen et al (2000). 
16 Cook et al. (1996); Lenhart et al. (1991); Schiffman and Frank (1995, 1998); Capek and Mackinnon (1997).      8 
 
 
1991 women earned 59% of what men earned.
18   However, these gaps are largely explained by 
differences in characteristics, particularly specialty choices and weeks or hours worked.  Since 
the 1980s, the unexplained gender differentials in hourly earnings are small - less than 13% in 
most analyses.
19  Among OB/GYNs, the unexplained differential may be even smaller: recent 
income gaps appear to match up reasonably well with measured productivity gaps.  Females’ 
mean net income is 85% of males’, and their productivity (measured by hours worked, or the 




  Physicians in different medical specialties engage in very different types of interaction 
with both colleagues and patients.  On the colleague side, certain specialties, such as surgery, 
have reputations for more gender discrimination by male physicians against female physicians.  
On the patient side, different specialties address different health concerns and therefore involve 
different doctor-patient relationships.  Some health concerns are such that patients may have a 
strong preference for or against female physicians whereas for other health concerns patients 
may not care either way (they may not even have much close personal interaction with their 
physician). 
  For this paper, the first key fact is that all OB/GYN patients are women.  The second is 
that many women express a strong preference for being treated by a female OB/GYN.  The third 
is that only a minority of OB/GYNs are female: less than 30% throughout the period covered by 
the data (1986-1996).  Together, these facts produce a large excess demand for female 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 Tesch et al. (1995); Notzer and Brown (1995); Abeshaus et al. (1993); Capek and Mackinnon (1997); Fitzpatrick 
and Wright (1995). 
18 Langwell (1982) using 1977 AMA data, Baker (1996) using the 1991 Young Physicians Survey. 
19 Kehrer (1976); Langwell (1982); Ohsfeldt and Culler (1986); Ohsfeldt, Culler, and Becker (1987); Baker (1996).   
20 Pearse et al (2001).  Data is from The 1998 Socioeconomic Survey of American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecology Fellows.      9 
 
 
OB/GYNs.  Although female patients may also have a gender preference for physicians in other 
specialties, these effects are likely to be much smaller.  For example, because patients have 
significant long-term interaction with their primary care physician, female patients may also 
prefer to be treated by a female General Practitioner (GP).  However, since not all GP patients 
are female and since the medical issues addressed by General Practitioners are less likely to be 
personal or sexual, this effect is probably much smaller.  The effect is certainly smaller for most 
other specialties and close to negligible in specialties in which there is little interaction between 
physicians and patients, such as anesthesiology, radiology, or pathology. 
  As a theoretical structure, I consider a simple supply-demand model augmented by a 
model of customer discrimination following Becker.  The good is a visit to a physician in a 
certain specialty, further defined by physician characteristics such as gender.
21  The demand is 
the number of patients desiring visits with physicians of that gender in that specialty, and is 
determined by the percentage of patients who are women and the preference (if any) for female 
physicians as opposed to male physicians.  The supply is the number of physicians of a certain 
gender in a certain specialty, and the relative supply of women within a certain specialty is the 
percentage of physicians in that specialty who are women.  (This supply is fixed in the short run, 
and possibly flexible in the long run.
22)  The price is both money and time.   The money price is 
the fee for the visit, and is largely determined and paid by insurance companies. The consumer 
                                                           
21 This model employs a simplified definition of the good in question: a visit to a physician in a certain specialty, 
further defined by physician characteristics such as gender.   This ignores several more subtle points. The good 
might be health, a positive health outcome, an hour of the doctor's time, or an hour of "quality time" with the doctor. 
It also assumes that the patient's assessment of value is most relevant.  However, there are many other possibilities 
for whose assessment matters: the medical profession, male or female doctors, male or female patients, or various 
institutions. 
22 Long-term supply may not be very responsive to demand pressures.  The supply of doctors is far from elastic.  
AMA accredited medical schools have close to a monopoly over the production of doctors, the Accreditation 
Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) controls the specialty distribution, and it is doubtful that they 
this process will supply exactly the right male/female ratio.  There is some elasticity from foreign medical graduates 
and from individuals’ choices of specialties within the ACGME framework.      10 
 
 
faces only a small or negligible portion of this price. The time price is how long a patient is 
willing to wait for the visit.  The consumer pays all of this price. 
Prices and quantities will adjust until the market clears. This adjustment should be 
observable in prices such as fees, waiting times, and incomes and in quantities such as hours 
worked, patients seen, or numbers of physicians in specialty-gender cells.  The crucial features 
that will produce actual price differentials between male and female OB/GYNs are the high 
patient preference for female OB/GYNs and the relatively low and inelastic supply of female 
OB/GYNs.
23  Assuming quantity adjustment is somewhat inelastic (patients either do or do not 
need to see a doctor, physicians only work so much and there are substantial entry barriers), price 
differentials will need to be non-zero in equilibrium.  Given that anti-discrimination law at least 
indirectly restricts many money prices within a specialty to be equal across genders, non-money 
prices may be more likely to adjust. 
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate this simple supply-demand model for the market for female 
OB/GYN services.  Both figures show price (both fee and wait) on the vertical axis and quantity 
on the horizontal axis.    Figure 1a shows the equilibrium reached if male and female physicians’ 
fees are constrained to be equal at Fee*.   If fees are so constrained and no other prices are 
available, the excess demand for female is shown by the length of line de.  If other prices are 
available – if waiting times adjust to achieve equilibrium – then a large waiting time Wait* for 
female physicians eliminates this excess demand.  In this case, the market is in equilibrium at the 
quantity  Q* and the combined price Fee* + Wait*.   However, this equilibrium presents 
significant welfare losses: the lost consumer and producer surplus is shown by the area B+C+E.   
This entire area is wasted due to the inflexibility of fees.  Patients spend the area B+C waiting, 
                                                           
23 Entry barriers should make the supply of female OB/GYNs inelastic.  As discussed above, there is a long lag in 
the production of physicians, and the flow is small enough relative to the stock that compositional changes are likely      11 
 
 
and physicians give up the area C in the form of lost income.  The area E is a traditional 
deadweight loss.  However, it is important to note that in fact the entire area B+C+E is a 
deadweight loss, since time spent waiting is not revenue that is transferred to anyone, it is just 
wasted. 
Figure 1b shows the equilibrium reached if male and female physicians’ fees are allowed 
to be different.  In this case, money prices clear the market and no waiting time adjustment is 
necessary.  Female physicians charge higher fees (Fee*female rather than Fee*male) and make 
correspondingly higher income in the areas C+G.   Patients pay higher money fees in the areas 
C+G.  However, patients no longer pay higher time prices (they now pay C as money and do not 
pay B at all).  The total payment made by patients -- money plus time -- is lower than it was 
when fees were rigid.   Furthermore, there is no deadweight loss and the equilibrium quantity is 
greater.   The adjustment of fees permits a Pareto improvement that benefits patients by saving 
them time and benefits female physicians by increasing their income.  In this scenario, female 
physicians are able to capture the rents generated by their scarcity value. 
  Of course, which of these scenarios best describes how the market for physicians’ 
services reaches equilibrium largely depends on the institutional constraints on the market. The 
primary institutions acting in this market are those that employ physicians (HMOs, hospitals, 
private practice) and those that pay for medical care (HMOs, PPOs, IPAs, traditional insurance 
companies).  This market is clearly not competitive.  It is a vertically integrated market in which 
doctors sell their services as an input to healthcare providers and the providers then sell these 
services to patients.  The price to the patient of a doctor's visit is determined by a number of non-
competitive factors, primarily various contract arrangements. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to be slow.  Even if all new OB/GYNs were female, the share female among OB/GYNs would increase by only 20 
percentage points in 10 years.      12 
 
 
  Since physicians do not receive payment for their services directly from patients, third 
party payers play an important role in this market.  Under a traditional insurance plan with 
retrospective payment, a physician submits a bill to the insurance company who then pays the 
physician with little negotiation about the amount.  Physicians are essentially independent and 
compete on both price and quality. Under an insurance plan with prospective payment, the 
insurance company pays the physician a pre-determined "usual and customary fee" for the 
service, a price set by the insurance company based on what it deems reasonable and generally 
discounted relative to what the physician would like to charge.  Physicians’ prices are therefore 
somewhat constrained, and therefore physicians compete more on quality than price.  A 
physician may enter into a contract arrangement, called a Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), 
with certain insurance companies under which he or she agrees to accept these usual and 
customary fees.   Patients are then given financial incentives to go to physicians who are 
members.  In more strictly managed care, prices are even less competitive, in many cases non-
existent.  In this case, patients pay a flat fee to be a member of a Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO) which agrees to provide all necessary healthcare.  Physicians are then 
employed by the HMO, and are paid primarily on a salaried basis rather than receiving fees 
directly from patients or insurance companies.  Many physicians remain in private practice and 
yet agree to provide services to an HMO through an Independent Practice Arrangement (IPA).  
In this paper, a physician is said to be in a contract arrangement if he or she is a member of an 
HMO, PPO, or IPA, and not in a contract arrangement if he or she is not a member of any such 
organization.  This distinction is intended to divide physicians into two groups based on their 
freedom to set their own prices. We expect that physicians in contract arrangements are 
somewhat limited in this respect, and that physicians not in contract arrangements have relatively 
more freedom.  It is important to note that, during the time period covered by the data (mid      13 
 
 
1980s to the 1990s), physicians were neither largely out of contracts nor largely in contracts: 
there were substantial numbers in each category.  This diverse organizational structure is 
precisely what provides the opportunity to investigate this question.  (It is also important to note 
that the results are generally robust to alternate definitions of contracting.) 
The market for physicians’ services is imperfectly competitive for other reasons as well.  
It is characterized by asymmetric information, because physicians know much more about health 
and illness than patients do, and by significant search costs, because patients have difficulty 
obtaining accurate information about physicians.  Physicians are in limited supply and sell 
differentiated, non-substitutable products.  They compete on both quality and price.  Patients 
have heterogeneous preferences over perceived quality, match, and characteristics.  Patients also 
do not bear the full price, and shop for physicians both on price and quality.  The combination of 
heterogeneous products and preferences with significant switching costs gives physicians market 
power.  The market is therefore best described as monopolistically competitive, with lower 
elasticities of demand for each individual physician than for the market as a whole.  Price 
differentials can persist in such a market, and the greater the informational imperfections and 
price frictions, the lower each physician’s individual demand elasticity and the larger the 
sustainable price differentials between physicians. 
  However, the institutional structures discussed above inhibit the flexibility of money 
prices, and physicians’ services are therefore likely to be rationed by additional mechanisms 
other than money price.  For physicians in contract arrangements, we would expect the relatively 
low flexibility of fees in response to patient demand to produce a larger adjustment of waiting 
times for physicians.  Patients may queue up to wait for the physician they want to see.  On the 
other hand, for physicians not in contract arrangements, we would expect the relatively higher 
flexibility of the fees in response to patient demand to produce larger adjustment of fees and      14 
 
 
smaller adjustment of waiting times.
24  Economic theory predicts that prices should clear the 
markets in the most efficient manner, subject to institutional constraints.  Thus, Figure 1a may 
come closest to describing the market for the services of physicians in contract arrangements, 
while Figure 1b may be best for describing the market for the services of physicians not in 
contract arrangements. 
  While both money and non-money prices effectively ration supply, they do not operate in 
the same manner.  As seen in Figure 1a, the implicit price for a good is the sum of the explicit 
money price and the value of the time spent waiting.  When money prices do not or cannot 
adjust, waiting time functions as a tax to raise the implicit price and thereby reduce demand.  
However, when time prices are used to reduce demand, both the traditional deadweight loss (area 
E) and the revenue (area B+C) are pure waste: the patient pays her time but the physician does 
not receive any payment.  This structure has two important consequences.  First, the optimal tax 
structure is exactly opposite from the standard optimal taxation result.  In this case, total waste is 
minimized when the tax in the form of the time price is the highest for the most elastically 
demanded goods.  However, this also maximizes the rents lost by producers of the desirable 
good: female OB/GYNs may lose out if demand for their services is reduced by longer waiting 
times (which provide them few benefits) rather than higher fees (which do provide them 
monetary benefits).  Second, since time is cheaper for those with lower income, using time prices 
                                                           
24 The non-competitive nature of the market is both an advantage and a disadvantage for the current analysis.  On the 
negative side, these non-competitive factors interfere with the adjustment mechanism (of prices, quantities, quality).  
For example, managed-care places controls on healthcare that restrict the movement of prices and quantities, altering 
the supply response.  If a doctor signs a contract for a certain income and there is little flexibility, her wage may not 
be able to adjust and she may just work more hours or have longer waiting times.  This could also be complicated by 
individual preferences causing selection bias into flexible or inflexible practice environments.  On the positive side, 
the market in itself is interesting.  Determining the response to the exogenous demand shock may enable us to 
characterize the market for physicians, obtaining structural information about the nature of the market that would be 
universally applicable.   This could eventually provide important insights about the interactions between 
discrimination, patient preference, monopsonistic behavior of insurance companies, and monopolistic behavior of 
medical schools in a highly organized labor market.       15 
 
 
essentially creates a sliding scale by income.  This may provide social benefits in the form of 
implicit transfers from the rich to the poor. 
  In sum, in a competitive market, female physicians should be able to extract rents for 
providing a desirable good available in limited quantities.  However, due to the non-competitive 
features of this market, adjustment may happen on several different margins.   I now outline a 
strategy for studying what actually occurs. 
 
IV. Empirical Approach 
  An ideal investigation of this question would take advantage of an extensive and detailed 
dataset on outcomes for physicians in different specialties.  I would examine the movement of 
prices and quantities in both the short run and the long run, and investigate the outcomes of 
female OB/GYNs relative to male OB/GYNs.   In fact, my current data and analysis come 
reasonably close to this ideal investigation for the short run.  I will first outline the prices and 
quantities I investigate and discuss the econometric specification, and then I will describe the 
data. 
A. Prices and Quantities 
To determine how the market for physician visits equilibrates, I examine relevant prices 
and quantities.  The prices are: standard fee for a routine visit with the physician, waiting time in 
weeks for an initial visit, annual income (in logs), and weekly income (in logs).  The fees and 
waiting times are given the most attention because they are the purest prices and are most likely 
to be flexible.  To the extent that physicians can set their own fees, standard fees may be flexible.  
However, as prospective insurance payments set fees centrally and managed care arrangements 
start to eliminate fees, standard fees will become more sticky.   Waiting times are extremely 
flexible: since there are few regulations and little awareness of these non-money prices for      16 
 
 
physician services, they are most likely to be able to adjust in response to supply and demand 
pressures.   The income measures are actually both prices (the price that an employer such as an 
HMO pays for a doctor) and aggregate outcome measures (the product of fees and patients seen).  
Therefore, incomes may exhibit less clear adjustment in response to market pressures either 
because they are set by a variety of non-competitive factors or because they are aggregated 
measures rather than pure prices. 
  The quantities investigated are: patients seen per week and hours worked per week. The 
quantities that are more likely to adjust in the short run are those under the control of the 
individual physician: patients seen and hours worked.  However, these variables are also labor 
supply variables, and consequently should be treated cautiously.  In addition, I do not investigate 
quantities of physicians because supplies of physicians are fixed in the short run and the data do 
not span a long enough time period to evaluate long-run changes in supply. 
B. Specification 
The basic model is a regression of a price or quantity on the female dummy, indicators 
for thirteen medical specialty categories,
25 the interactions of those specialty categories with the 
female dummy, and other controls.  The other controls include basic demographics: age, race, 
region, a quadratic in experience, a married dummy, and a parent dummy.  The other controls 
also include professional demographics: indicator variables for AMA membership, board 
certification, private practice, a contract arrangement, and salaried pay.
26  Models in which 
observations are pooled across years include a linear time trend and the interaction of this time 
                                                           
25 The thirteen medical specialty categories are: general family practice, general internal medicine, specialty with no 
subspecialties, medical subspecialty, general surgery, surgical specialty/subspecialty, pediatrics, OB/GYN, 
radiology, psychiatry, anesthesiology, pathology, and other.  See Appendix Table 1 for more detail.  All dollar 
values in pooled specifications are in 1986 dollars. 
26  A more detailed specification also includes parent, number of children, and interactions of these with gender, and 
malpractice claims in the past.  However, the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these variables.      17 
 
 
trend with the female dummy, with the specialty categories, and with the interaction of the 
female dummy and specialty categories.
27 
The goal is to determine whether female OB/GYNs have significantly different outcomes 
than male OB/GYNs in excess of general gender differentials among physicians.  Thus, the 
model estimated is as follows: 
  Outcomei = α 0 + α 1 I(female) i + α 2 I(OB/GYN) i + α 3 I(female) i * I(OB/GYN) i  
+  Σspecialties [ δj I(specialty) + γj I(female)* I(specialty)]  +  Xi β  + εi  
                                   Eqn. 1. 
28 
 
The coefficient of interest is α3 : the interaction between the female dummy and the OB/GYN 
dummy.  The specification employed for Equation 1 is ordinary least squares with Huber-White 
robust standard errors. 
The main question is: exactly how do female OB/GYNs compare to male OB/GYNs?   
Does gender play a different role in OB/GYN than in other specialties?  I will focus primarily on 
the behavior of money and time prices -- standard fees and waiting times – since these prices 
might be more likely to be flexible and accurately measured, thereby providing a clearer picture 
of the manner in which the market equilibrates. 
C. Data 
  The primary data sources are the Young Physicians Surveys (YPS) conducted in 1987, 
1991, and 1997 by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Mathematica Policy Research, and the 
American Medical Association (AMA).   These surveys collected information about the practice 
patterns and perceptions of the medical profession from 5,868 physicians in 1987, 6,053 in 1991, 
                                                           
27 For waiting times and standard fees, only those specialties that have relevant values of these variables were 
included in the analysis. Physicians in certain specialties may not see patients directly, and therefore may not have a 
standard fee for a regular visit or a waiting time for an initial appointment.  Such specialties include Radiology, 
Anesthesiology, Pathology, Public Health, Emergency Medicine, and Aerospace Medicine.  These specialties are 
excluded from analyses of standard fees and waiting times.      18 
 
 
and 1,452 in 1997.  Some of these are multiple observations of particular individuals: the total 
13,373 observations include 5,011 individuals with a single year of data, 2,996 individuals with 
two years of data, and 790 individuals with three years of data (see Appendix Table 2). 
  The samples were drawn from the AMA Socioeconomic Monitoring System master file 
to include physicians who had been in practice for two to nine years and who were less than 40 
years old (45 in 1991).  By choosing young physicians less than nine years out of medical 
school, the sample is designed to be relatively homogeneous.  This conveniently eliminates 
biases that would otherwise be present due to the difference between the installed base of 
physicians (older and primarily male) and the flow of new physicians (younger and more 
female).  It also provides a sample that includes substantially more women of all specialties and 
a significant number of female OB/GYNs.
29  The data use weights designed to adjust for 
differential response rates within the eligible sample across identifiable sample subgroups and 
for selection of an oversample of black and Hispanic individuals.
30 
  The survey covered a wide range of topics including practice setting, numbers and types 
of patients seen, income, hours, and physicians' perceptions of their careers, the medical 
profession, and discrimination.
31,32  The key variables available in these data (and unavailable 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
28 The base case is a male physician in general practice in the Northeast. The function I(⋅) is an indicator function; 
e.g. I(female) is 0 for male physicians and 1 for female physicians. 
29 It is crucial for the current analysis that the data include a substantial number of female OB/GYNs.  Because 
female OB/GYNs represented only 1.2% of all physicians in 1990, available datasets covering physicians of all ages 
generally include very few female OB/GYNs.  A sample of young physicians not only includes many more female 
OB/GYNs, but also provides a sample with less confounding heterogeneity in labor market experience and other 
characteristics.  Both of these aspects of the data are critical. 
30 These weights were provided by the Principal Investigator. More detail on the construction of these weights can 
be found in the codebooks for the data sets.  Weights were made consistent across the different years of data by a 
similar procedure. 
31 In addition, data from the Student and Applicant Information Management System database (SAIMS) file is 
included for about half of the observations.  This database includes information collected throughout each 
individual's medical school career. 
32 The 1987 YPS also includes encrypted geographic codes that provide access to characteristics of the local health 
care market.  Variables of particular interest in these data are: numbers of physicians within each specialty and by 
gender; and population composition by age, race, income, and household size.  These can be used to test specific 
hypotheses about the role of local supply and demand conditions.  Unfortunately, population numbers by gender are 
not available.      19 
 
 
elsewhere) are standard fees and waiting times.  Standard fees are in answer to the question “In 
this practice, what is your current usual fee for an office visit with an established patient 
including an examination and/or treatment for the same or new illness?”
33   While the “typical” 
office visit may certainly vary across OB/GYNs depending on the focus of their practice (e.g. 
low-risk obstetrics vs. gynecologic oncology), this standard fee variable is the best variable 
available (in this or other datasets) to measure the price of a relatively uniform medical good 
across physicians. 
Waiting times are in answer to the question “How many days does a new patient wishing 
to see you in this practice typically have to wait for an appointment?”   The waiting time 
therefore represents the time from an initial phone call to the physician's office to the soonest 
possible appointment.  It is not the number of hours a patient sits in the waiting room before 
seeing the physician.
34  Lastly, it is important to note that the standard fee and waiting time 
variables are only available in the 1987 and 1991 surveys.  For this reason, I use only those years 
of data in the full analysis.  Furthermore, although repeat observations are available on some 
individual physicians, I use only the first observation on any one physician.  This insures that 
physicians are homogeneous in their years of experience: all first interviews have less than five 
years of experience out of medical school. 
  A second data source is from the American Medical Association (AMA), which collects 
data about all of its members in its Physician Masterfile, the most comprehensive source of 
information about physicians in the United States.  The AMA publishes summary tables from 
these data annually or biannually, providing detailed tabulations of the distribution of physicians 
                                                           
33 Fees did not require any cleaning beyond removing extreme values. 
34 Although the physicians quoted their waiting times in days, I have recoded them to weeks.  The raw data clearly 
indicated that some individuals were counting 5-day weeks while others were counting 7-day weeks.  The re-coding 
algorithm created a consistent measure of waiting time in weeks.  It also truncated waiting times at a maximum of 
26 weeks to remove extreme values.      20 
 
 
by specialty, gender, type of practice, etc.  These data are the source for the gender distribution 
within each specialty in each year. 
D. Basic facts 
  Summary statistics of the main variables from the YPS are provided in Table 1, separated 
by sex.  Women are relatively well represented: the sample is 23% female in 1987 and 29% 
female in 1991.  In addition, the sample is relatively evenly split between physicians who are in 
contract arrangements and those who are not in such arrangements: this share is approximately 
one-third in 1987, and rises to one-half in 1991.  This will be important for the later analysis 
investigating the role of contract setting. Women's net income is significantly lower: 
approximately 70% of men's in both years.  Furthermore, women work fewer hours per week 
(approximately 50 vs. 60), see fewer patients per week (approximately 10% fewer than men), 
and have longer waiting times for an initial appointment (more than 40% longer).  They are also 
slightly less likely to be in private practice.  They have similar age and race distributions, but are 
less likely to be married and have fewer children.  An Oaxaca decomposition of the income 
differential shows that most of the 30% difference in annual income is explained by differences 
in characteristics such as specialty.
35 
  Medical specialties are important in determining the values of many of these variables. 
(Appendix Table 1 provides a list of specialties and major specialty categories.)  Table 2 and 
Figure 2 show the female share within each specialty from 1970 to 2000.  The percentage female 
overall has risen from 7.6% in 1970 to 24% in 2000.  However, this increase has not been 
                                                           
35 The Oaxaca decomposition of the income differential is shown in Appendix Table 3.  The log annual income 
difference of 30 to 45% is largely explained by differences in characteristics.  Approximately 1/4 to 1/3 of the 
difference is explained by specialty and practice setting characteristics (13 large specialty categories, 6 categories 
for practice setting, and whether the physician is in a contract arrangement), while 1/2 to 2/3 can be explained by 
adding personal and physician demographics (age, experience, experience squared, marriage, children, race, region, 
AMA membership, board certification, prior malpractice claims, patients per week, hours per week).  Differential 
returns to family variables such as marriage, children, and a non-working spouse are a significant source of the 
remaining differential.      21 
 
 
distributed equally across specialties.  The primary differences are the higher shares of women in 
psychiatry, obstetrics and gynecology, and especially pediatrics, and the extremely low share of 
women in surgery.  The dissimilarity index is another way to measure the distribution of men 
and women across specialties.  This index reflects the share of individuals who would need to 
switch specialties to make the distributions equal for men and women. In the late 1990s, this 
index was 0.20, which is small relative to dissimilarity indices for overall gender occupational 
segregation, which generally exceed 0.60.
36 
  Within obstetrics and gynecology, the share of physicians who are female has risen from 
7.1% in 1975 to 22.4% in 1990 and to 35.1% in 2000.  The increase in the female share of 
OB/GYN residents has been even more dramatic: from 13% in 1975 to 58% in 1995 and further 
to 65% in 1998.
37  Thus, the flow into OB/GYN is increasingly female, but since the annual flow 
replaces only 2% of the stock, it takes quite a while for the stock to become more female.  Table 
3 shows the gender comparison within OB/GYN.  The gender gap in income is somewhat 
smaller than that among all physicians.  Male and female OB/GYNs are also similar on many 
important measures -- weeks worked, hours worked, patients seen.  Men are slightly more likely 
to be in private practice, board certified, or in a contract arrangement.  Women are less likely to 
be married or to have children. The waiting time differential is striking: the average waiting time 
for a male OB/GYN in 1987 is 2.16 weeks, and for a female is 3.79 weeks.  In 1991, these 
numbers are 2.52 and 5.03 respectively.  There is also a slight differential in standard fees: the 
average standard fee in 1987 for a male OB/GYN is $40.25, and for a female is $45.25.  In 1991, 
these numbers are $58.33 and $62.40, respectively.  These differentials will be investigated more 
carefully in the subsequent analysis, but they are a first indication that excess patient demand for 
                                                           
36 See Cutler, Glaeser, Vigdor (1999) for details about the dissimilarity index, and Goldin (1990) for more 
discussion of gender segregation.  This index was calculated using the 1997 AMA data. 
37 American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.      22 
 
 




V. Empirical Results 
  I now discuss the primary empirical results.  Tables 4, 5, and 6 show these results using 
the 1987 and 1991 YPS data for waiting times, standard fees, log annual income, log weekly 
income, log hourly income, log patients seen per week, and log hours worked per week.  Each 
table has six columns.  Columns 1, 3, and 5 show the results for specifications that include a 
single dummy for 1991, but do not include any interactions of the 1991 dummy with other 
variables.  They therefore show only three coefficients for each regression: the coefficient on the 
female dummy, the coefficient for the OB/GYN dummy, and the coefficient for the interaction of 
the two.  Columns 2, 4, and 6 show the results for specifications that include a single dummy for 
1991 and also include interactions of the 1991 dummy with other variables.  These columns 
therefore show six coefficients for each regression: the coefficient on the female dummy, the 
coefficient for the OB/GYN dummy, and the coefficient for the interaction of the two, plus the 
interactions of these three coefficients with a dummy indicating 1991.   Furthermore, the 
columns of the tables show analysis on different samples:  columns 1 and 2 show results for all 
physicians, both inside and outside of contract arrangements; columns 3 and 4 show results for 
physicians not in contract arrangements; columns 5 and 6 show results for physicians in contract 
arrangements.  As discussed above, a physician is said to be in a contract arrangement if he or 
                                                           
38 For reference, the same gender comparison by year for physicians in General Practice is shown in Appendix Table 
4.      23 
 
 
she is a member of an HMO, PPO, or IPA, and not in a contract arrangement if he or she is not a 
member of any such organization.
39 
Furthermore, the coefficients shown in the tables represent the effect of OB/GYN relative 
to the base specialty of General Practice, and the effect of the female interaction with OB/GYN 
relative to a weighted average of all other specialties.  That is, the coefficients are those from a 
simplified specification that omits the interaction of the female dummy with the other specialty 
categories: 
 Outcomei = α 0 + α 1 I(female) i + α 2 I(OB/GYN) i + α 3 I(female) i * I(OB/GYN) i  




This provides a clearer picture of gender-specific within-OB/GYN differentials.  However, in all 
cases the full specification shown in Equation 1 has also been tested, as well as a specification 
without any specialty dummies at all.  Wald tests on those coefficients confirm the results 
discussed below, and hence it is acceptable to omit the more detailed set of interactions.  Lastly, 
recall that this specification is run as ordinary least squares on the pooled 1987 and 1991 data.   
Other specifications and samples have also been employed, and the results confirm those 
discussed herein.
41 
A. Spot Prices: Waiting Times and Fees 
Results for the Full Sample 
                                                           
39 While the analysis is performed with this particular definition of “contracted” versus “not contracted” physicians, 
the main results are robust to alternate definitions. 
40 The function I(⋅) is an indicator function; e.g. I(female) is 0 for male physicians and 1 for female physicians. 
41 Analyses performed on a cross-section within a given survey year confirm all quoted results. Analyses performed 
on the unbalanced panel of all observations from all three survey years use a random effects specification to adjust 
for likely covariance among repeated observations on a given physician.  Although individual-specific fixed effects 
due to selection on ability are of concern, random effects is more appropriate because physicians rarely change 
specialties and a fixed effects specification would not provide sufficient identification.  Three versions of a random 
effects specification have been run: pooled OLS with clustered errors, maximum likelihood random effects and      24 
 
 
  Results for waiting times and fees in the pooled OLS specification for the full sample are 
shown in Table 4.  Waiting times exhibit the most significant and interesting market adjustment.   
The gender-specific within-OB/GYN waiting time differential is 1.27 weeks, highly significant 
with a p-value less than 0.0005 (column 1).
42  This gender-specific within-OB/GYN coefficient 
of more than one week is in addition to the significant gender coefficient of 0.38 weeks.  The 
inclusion of time interactions changes the coefficient only slightly, showing that the coefficient is 
slightly higher in 1991 (column 2).  Since the waiting time is the time from an initial phone call 
to the physician's office to the soonest available appointment with that physician, it represents 
the length of the queue.
43  This differential indicates that patients do in fact wait longer for an 
appointment with a female OB/GYN, as one method of paying for this desirable good.    Patients 
should be willing to wait to the point where the marginal cost of waiting equals the marginal 
benefit of seeing a female OB/GYN rather than a male OB/GYN.  It appears that in this case 
patients are able to pay higher time prices by waiting nearly a week and a half longer to see a 
female OB/GYN. 
  The results for standard fees are also interesting.   The gender-specific within-OB/GYN 
fee differential is $3.77, which is almost significant with a p-value of 0.13 (column 1).
44  Since a 
physician's standard fee is his or her usual fee for a normal visit with an established patient, the 
differential indicates that female patients do in fact pay more money to see a female OB/GYN 
rather than a male OB/GYN.  Furthermore, this effect is specific to OB/GYN and not uniform 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
feasible generalized least squares.  The results are robust to the choice of specification, and also confirm the OLS 
results discussed in the paper. 
42 This differential is similar in a Tobit specification.  A Tobit specification is employed for waiting times because 
many physicians appear to report actual waiting times of zero days (which have been recoded into weeks).   The 
Tobit appropriately corrects for left truncation at zero. There appears to be little difference in the results.  It also 
might be expected that waiting time results would be non-linear as waiting times become excessively large, but no 
correction has been made for such non-linearity.  It does not appear to be a significant issue. 
43 Note that this is the waiting time until the first available appointment for a new patient, so it represents the length 
of the queue for new patients only.  The standard fee, on the other hand, is a recurring event. 
44 This effect is slightly sensitive to the specification, but is similar in all three random effects specifications.      25 
 
 
across specialties: the market for physician services does appear to allow money prices to adjust 
competitively, at least somewhat.  In addition to paying higher time prices, patients are able to 
pay higher money prices to obtain the more desirable good.  However, inclusion of time 
interactions shows that this effect is almost entirely confined to 1987: the gender-specific within-
OB/GYN coefficient in column 2 is $4.81, while the interaction with the 1991 dummy is –$4.87.  
Thus, it appears that by 1991 patients are not paying higher money prices to see a female 
OB/GYN. 
Segregating by contract arrangement: what is the role of market restrictions?  
 Contract  arrangements  clearly  restrict the flexibility of physicians' fees.  In a contract 
arrangement we would expect the low flexibility of fees in response to patient demand to 
produce a larger adjustment of waiting times.  On the other hand, for those physicians not in 
contract arrangements, we would expect the relatively high flexibility of the fees in response to 
patient demand to produce smaller adjustment of waiting times and larger adjustment of fees.  To 
test this hypothesis, I rerun the above model segregated by whether a physician does or does not 
have a contract arrangement of any kind.
45  A contract arrangement is defined as an HMO, a 
PPO, or an IPA.
46  The percentage of physicians of each gender who do or do not have such 
contract arrangements is shown in Table 7.  These percentages are similar for men and women, 
and rise steeply from 35% in 1987 to 87% in 1997, reflecting the advent of managed-care.  It is 
important for this analysis that the time period considered is one in which both methods of 
physician reimbursement coexisted (rather than earlier years when managed care was a minor 
                                                           
45 I run separate regression segregated by contract arrangement (rather than including interactions with contract 
arrangement) because there are reasons to expect that many aspects of the labor market are different inside and 
outside of contract arrangements. 
46 The definition of various types of contract arrangements has evolved over time.  Possibly more importantly, 
physicians' knowledge of these definitions has become more accurate.  For these reasons, it seems most accurate to 
use a variable indicating any type of contract arrangement rather than a specific type of arrangement.      26 
 
 
presence or later years when managed care came to be nearly universal.)  Table 7 confirms that 
this is the case. 
  The results shown in Table 4 directly confirm the hypothesis that waiting times will 
adjust for physicians in contract arrangements, whereas fees will adjust for physicians not in 
contract arrangements.  Columns 3 and 5 of Table 4 show the results for physicians with no 
contract arrangement and physicians with a contract arrangement, respectively.  Among 
physicians who have no contract arrangement, standard fees for female OB/GYNs are $10.67 
higher than their male counterparts’.  At the same time, their waiting times are slightly higher but 
insignificantly so – the coefficient is 0.76 weeks, with a standard error of 0.48.  These 
physicians, not constrained by contract arrangements, are able to charge higher fees for their 
more desirable services, and their appointments are not rationed by waiting times.  The standard 
fee effect is more than twice that found when all physicians, regardless of contract arrangement, 
are included. 
  Among physicians who do have contract arrangements, the story is exactly the reverse.  
Standard fees for female OB/GYNs are insignificantly higher than those of male OB/GYNs, 
while their waiting times are 1.59 weeks longer.  These physicians, constrained by contract 
arrangements, appear to be unable to charge higher fees, and simply have much longer waiting 
times.  They do not appear to gain monetarily from the excess demand for their services, and 
their visits seem to be rationed by waiting times. 
  Thus, patients who go to physicians without contract arrangements pay more money to 
see a female OB/GYN while patients who go to physicians with contract arrangements pay more 
time to see a female OB/GYN.  The percentage premium for fees is approximately 20% whereas 
the percentage premium for waiting times is close to 80%.  Patients pay in whatever manner the 
contract arrangement permits.  Physicians do not earn money directly from waiting times, and      27 
 
 
only physicians not in contract arrangements receive higher fees for their desirable services.  The 
elasticities of patient demand with respect to these two different prices are probably different, but 
unfortunately the current data do not permit identification of these elasticities.  However, in light 
of the literature indicating patients' low willingness to pay for medical care and their strong sense 
of entitlement to medical care, it is not surprising that patients pay proportionately smaller 
money premia as compared with time premia.  It is also important to remember that these are not 
straightforward prices: patients pay very little of the money price directly (much is paid by 
insurance companies), and the waiting time price is a complex combination of inconvenience, 
impatience, and possibly deteriorating health. 
Changes between 1987 and 1991 
  The inclusion of interactions with the time dummy shows that these results carry through 
for 1991 (columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 4).   For waiting times, in the full sample, the significant 
differential is changed only slightly (1.14 plus 0.29).   Furthermore, the waiting time differentials 
remain consistent with the institutional story, but the contrast between non-contracted and 
contracted physicians is neither as large nor as significant in 1991 as in 1987.   For fees, the 
differential in the full sample is negative and insignificant in 1991 (a net effect of -0.06).   The 
results by contract arrangement are not significantly changed: the contrast between non-
contracted and contracted physicians may have widened somewhat, but the change is imprecisely 
estimated. 
Overall, the evidence in 1991 shows that patients are still paying higher time prices, but 
are no longer paying significantly higher money prices, to see a female OB/GYN.  These results 
could very well be related to the high penetration of managed care in 1991.  Even for physicians 
not in contract arrangements, by 1991 more and more fees were centrally set by insurance 
companies.  In addition, there were many fewer non-contracted physicians, and it is reasonable      28 
 
 
to assume that there may have been selection effects between non-contracted and contracted 
status.   It is also possible that there were selection effects for patients: as more patients got their 
health care through contracted physicians, those who remained with non-contracted physicians 
may have been more likely to have strong preferences about the provision of their care.  Both 
types of selection – physician and patient – among different health plans are well documented in 
the literature, and might contribute to the attenuation of the waiting time differential by 1991. 
B. Income Measures 
Results for the Full Sample 
  We might expect female OB/GYNs to earn higher incomes for two reasons.  First, we 
saw above that in some cases they charge higher fees.  This may carry over to higher incomes.  
Second, physicians in some contract arrangements may be paid at least partially on a salaried 
basis rather than fee basis, and employers may recruit female OB/GYNs by offering them higher 
salaries.  The data provide support for both of these stories.  The results for annual, weekly, and 
hourly income are shown in Table 5.  They show an insignificant gender-specific within-
OB/GYN premium of 8% in annual income and a significant premium of 13% in weekly income.   
However, because the overall female differential is -26% in annual income and -22% in weekly 
income, female OB/GYNs still earn less than male OB/GYNs.  There is thus mild evidence that 
women in OB/GYN earn differentially more than women in other specialties: while women in 
other specialties earn approximately 22% less weekly income than men in those specialties, 
women in OB/GYN earn approximately 9% less.  It appears that women in OB/GYN may gain 
some income from the excess preference for the service they provide.  They close the gender 
income gap partially, but not completely. 
By contract arrangement      29 
 
 
  Segregation by contract arrangement provides some additional insight into the gender 
income differentials.   Among physicians who have no contract arrangement, there is no gender-
specific within OB/GYN differential in annual income.  For weekly income, however, the effect 
is positive and insignificant: 15% with a standard error of 10%.  Adding these to the overall 
gender differential, among non-contracted physicians, women in OB/GYN earn 20% less annual 
income but only 5% less weekly income than men in OB/GYN (controlling for other 
characteristics).  This 5% differential in weekly income is remarkably small: female physicians' 
weekly incomes are much closer to those of their male counterparts within OB/GYN than they 
are in other specialties.  Given that this differential is much smaller for weekly incomes, one 
possibility is that non-contracted female OB/GYNs choose to use their slightly higher standard 
fees to increase their weekly income while slightly reducing the number of weeks they work, 
keeping their annual income unchanged.  However, these results are not statistically significant, 
and should therefore be viewed as merely suggestive rather than conclusive. 
  Among physicians who do have a contract arrangement, there are significant within-
OB/GYN gender differentials of 14% in annual income and 14% in weekly income.  Among 
contracted physicians, female OB/GYNs also earn higher incomes than women in other 
specialties.  Their incomes are still approximately 14% lower than those of contracted men in 
OB/GYN, but this is the smallest gender gap within any specialty.  Thus, in contract 
arrangements, female OB/GYNs definitively reduce the gender gaps in both annual and weekly 
income by more than one-half. 
These results – that female OB/GYNs close the gender gap both outside and inside of 
contract arrangements – lend support to the common beliefs among physicians that female 
OB/GYNs both make larger incomes in private practice and are sought after by managed-care 
employers with offers of higher salaries.  These results provide some support for the hypothesis      30 
 
 
that female OB/GYNs’ bargaining power works both on patients and on employers.  It appears 
that, while bargaining with patients may yield longer waiting times and slightly higher fees, 
neither of these translates directly into increasing income substantially.  On the other hand, 
bargaining with employers in managed care contracts appears to yield more tangible effects on 
income. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of time interactions (columns 2, 4, and 6) suggests that, for 
physicians not in contract arrangements, the net gender income premia within OB/GYN might 
actually be positive by 1991.  These effects of greater than 10% in annual and weekly income are 
far from statistically significant, however, so should be treated as suggestive only.  It is possible 
that, by 1991, female OB/GYNs not in contract arrangements are quite able to translate larger fee 
differentials (suggested in column 4 of Table 4) into larger annual and weekly incomes 
(suggested in column 4 of Table 5).  For female OB/GYNs in contract arrangements, the results 
for 1991 are not significantly different from the results for 1987. 
Lastly, the analysis of hourly income shows small and insignificant within-OB/GYN 
gender differentials.  The coefficients do suggest that female OB/GYNs might have received 
slightly higher hourly incomes by 1991, particularly outside of contract arrangements. 
C. Quantities: Patients and Hours 
Results for the Full Sample 
  In addition to charging higher fees, female OB/GYNs could be making this extra income 
by seeing more patients each week or working more hours each week.  This is confirmed by the 
data, as shown in Table 6.   The gender-specific within-OB/GYN coefficient shows a 19% 
premium for patients and a 15% premium for hours.   When these coefficients are added to the 
overall gender differentials of -16% and -23%, female OB/GYNs see similar numbers of patients  
as male OB/GYNs (3% more) and work slightly fewer hours (8% fewer).  The salient point is      31 
 
 
that, while female physicians normally see fewer patients and work fewer hours, female 
OB/GYNs see approximately the same number of patients and work almost the same hours.  
Female OB/GYNs may be meeting excess demand by seeing more patients and working slightly 
more hours each week. 
By contract arrangement 
  The results for patients and hours are not significantly affected by the segregation by 
contract arrangement.  The results from the complete sample carry through: while female 
physicians normally see fewer patients and work fewer hours than male physicians, female 
OB/GYNs both inside and outside of contract arrangements see similar numbers of patients and 
work similar hours.  There is some weak evidence that female OB/GYNs in contract 
arrangements see slightly fewer patients and that female OB/GYNs not in contract arrangements 
work slightly fewer hours, but this is not significant.  
 
VI. Discussion 
  The results just presented provide substantial insight into the question at hand: how does 
the imperfectly competitive market for OB/GYN services clear in the short run in the face of an 
excess demand for female OB/GYNs?  The results indicate that female patients do in fact pay 
higher time and money prices to see female OB/GYNs rather than male OB/GYNs.  The 
adjustment of waiting times is much larger than that of standard fees: the waiting time premium 
is approximately 58% (a 1.3 premium on top of a male waiting time of 2.2) whereas the standard 
fee differential is approximately 10% ($3.8 on top of $40).  Patients are more able and/or willing 
to pay with time than with money, and these time prices do adjust.  At the same time, fees adjust 
slightly and female OB/GYNs may earn slightly more income per week than they otherwise      32 
 
 
would.  They also work almost the same hours and see almost as many patients as male 
OB/GYNs, whereas female physicians usually work fewer hours and see fewer patients. 
  How well do these various differentials explain the within-OB/GYN gender differentials 
in income?  On average, female OB/GYNs work 8% fewer hours, see 3% more patients, and 
charge 8% higher standard fees.  So, if we calculate a predicted weekly income as the product of 
hours and fees, the gender differential should be about zero.  If we calculate predicted weekly 
income as the product of patients and fees, the gender differential should be a positive 11%.   
However, in reality the gender differential in weekly income is a negative 9%.  It is plausible that 
factors other than revenue generated from standard appointments are contributing to income and 
can explain this discrepancy.  One possibility is that, while women may be able to charge higher 
fees for a given task, they perform a less expensive mix of tasks and thereby generate less 
income.  Women may choose to work a more standard week with less time on-call, and therefore 
do more standard office visits and fewer middle-of-the-night expensive procedures.  This 
different mix of tasks might explain the gap between actual weekly income and weekly income 
that would be predicted from multiplying number of patients seen per week times the standard 
fee to see a patient in a routine office visit.  This is also supported by the fact that the net gender 
gap within OB/GYN is smaller for physicians in contract arrangements, who might be expected 
to have less flexibility in their choice of work schedule or procedure mix.
47 
Thus, while it is true that female OB/GYNs are charging slightly higher fees and are 
gaining higher weekly income from the excess demand for their services, they are not fully 
closing the gap.  Although they do command higher prices, they do not appear to be capturing 
the full value of the rents they generate.  Figure 3 illustrates this with a simple supply-demand 
model for the market for female OB/GYN services.  Like Figures 1a and 1b, the graph shows      33 
 
 
price (both fee and wait) on the vertical axis and quantity on the horizontal axis.  The excess 
demand present at the initial fee (the fee for a male physician), Fee0, is shown by the length of 
line ae.  The lost consumer and producer surplus in this initial case is shown by the entire area 
A+B+C+D+E.   Now assume that the market allows some adjustment of female OB/GYN fees 
relative to male OB/GYN fees, and some increase in the quantity of female OB/GYN visits.  The 
equilibrium quantity is marked as Q*, while the equilibrium prices are marked as Fee* and 
Wait*.   A small adjustment of female OB/GYN fees, ΔFee, does slightly reduce the welfare 
losses due to market inefficiency.   Patients wait slightly less and gain area A in the value of time 
saved, while female physicians charge slightly higher fees and gain area D in the form of higher 
income.  Due to the limited quantity adjustment and the limited flexibility of fees, however, there 
is still significant waste.  Patients pay with both time and money (they pay Fee* + Wait*) and 
spend significant time waiting (area B+C).  The cost imposed on the patient of the higher time 
price is, however, not clear: some patients may find it inconveniences them very little to wait an 
extra week.  On the other hand, physicians do not receive payment for the full value of their 
services (they only receive Fee* x Q*, and lose the area C).  While these losses are first-order, 
there is also a second-order deadweight loss (area E).  Overall, female OB/GYNS appropriate 
only a small portion of the rents created by their scarcity value. 
  Segregating physicians by whether or not they have a contract arrangement adds more 
structure to the main results.  Female patients do pay higher time and money prices to see female 
OB/GYNs rather than male OB/GYNs.  However, the fees of physicians in contract 
arrangements are inflexible or nonexistent.  Therefore, patients seeing physicians in such 
arrangements do not pay higher money prices but do pay significantly higher time prices, on the 
order of two weeks more.  On the other hand, patients seeing physicians not in such 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
47 Further work will use detailed data (obtained from ACOG) on the practice patterns of OB/GYNs to investigate      34 
 
 
arrangements do pay higher money prices but do not wait significantly longer.  The flexibility of 
fees outside of contract arrangements allows the market to equilibrate almost entirely through 
money prices rather than time prices. 
  However, this does not mean that female OB/GYNs in contract arrangements receive no 
benefits from the excess demand for their services. Even though female OB/GYNs in contract 
arrangements cannot charge higher fees for their more desirable services, they do receive an 
income premium.  Their incomes are closer to those of male OB/GYNs than they would be in 
other specialties.  Both inside and outside of contract arrangements, female OB/GYNs have 
weekly incomes closer to those of their male counterparts than they would in other specialties.  
They also work similar hours and see similar numbers of patients per week.  Female OB/GYNs 
in contract arrangements appear to close the gender gap with higher salaries, while those outside 
of such arrangements close the gap with higher fees.  However, as stated above, although they 
capture some of the increased value they provide, they almost certainly do not capture all of it. 
On the patient side, the appropriate interpretation of the waiting time price is also 
intriguing: to what extent is this actually a cost imposed on patients?  In many countries with 
national health insurance, time prices are one of the primary mechanisms by which health care 
goods are allocated.  If waiting times are costless and equally so for different groups, this could 
be an efficient and equitable to allocate goods and provide a relatively easy way to reduce moral 
hazard.  However, if the waiting times are in fact very burdensome to patients, or if waiting times 
are distributed inequitably, this mechanism could be both inefficient and inequitable.  The results 
of this paper imply that, as money prices play an increasingly smaller role in the allocation of 
health care in the United States, we may see similar allocative inefficiencies and inequities arise.      
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




I began this paper by arguing that the increase in demand for female OB/GYNs has 
outpaced the increase in supply and asking what outcomes this excess demand would produce 
given that the market for physicians’ services is imperfectly competitive.  The answer is that 
female patients pay both higher time and higher money prices to see female OB/GYNs rather 
than male OB/GYNs.  The adjustment of waiting times is much larger than that of standard fees, 
and the relative price adjustments differ by contract arrangement in precisely the ways that 
theory would predict.  When money prices are sticky or nonexistent, patients pay with time.  
When money prices can adjust, patients pay with money and do not pay with higher waiting 
times.  For physicians, this means that female OB/GYNs outside of contract arrangements can 
more directly reap the benefits of the higher demand for their services.  However, female 
OB/GYNs subject to contract arrangements also appear to earn an income premium, possibly as 
a result of reportedly aggressive and preferential recruitment by health care organizations. 
Thus, in some manner, prices adjust to equilibrate the high relative demand for female 
physicians with the low relative supply.  The market for physicians’ services is far from 
competitive, and it reaches equilibrium in a complex manner that includes the adjustment of non-
traditional prices and an important role for health care institutions.  Outside of contract 
arrangements, patients pay more money for the desired services.  Inside contract arrangements, 
patients are unable to pay with money and therefore pay with time.  Either way, female 
OB/GYNs appear to earn higher incomes relative to male OB/GYNs than they would if they 
were in another specialty.  However, they do not appear to capture the full value of the preferred 
good they provide.  Since much of the adjustment occurs on waiting times, patients pay in time 
but little monetary payment is transferred to the physician.  Gender discrimination on the part of 
patients alleviates gender gaps among physicians partially, but not completely.  Market      36 
 
 
adjustment occurs but is incomplete. If unfettered markets generally do a good job allocating 
goods, this situation is an example of a restricted market that does not do a particularly good job 
allocating goods.  In this case, both patients and physicians lose out due to market rigidities.  The 
larger implications for the matching of patients to physicians and the optimal allocation of health 
care goods, as well for gender discrimination in professional occupations, are of great interest 
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nTable 2.  Percentage Female within Medical Specialty Categories, 1970-2000.
Specialty Category 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
General Family Practice GP 4.3 5.3 7.8 11.9 15.0 21.4 26.2
General Internal Medicine IM 5.7 7.4 11.4 16.6 19.5 24.0 27.6
Specialty with no Subspecialties SP 8.9 10.1 9.5 14.2 17.6 21.4 23.5
Medical Subspecialty MS 4.5 4.1 4.4 5.5 6.6 8.5 9.6
General Surgery GS 1.0 1.8 3.4 5.2 6.3 8.8 11.0
Surgical Specialty/Subspecialty SS 1.3 1.5 2.3 3.6 4.7 6.4 7.3
Pediatrics PD 20.8 23.1 28.4 34.5 38.3 44.7 48.6
OBGYN OB 7.1 8.2 12.3 18.1 22.4 29.8 35.1
Radiology RD 5.0 6.2 8.6 11.8 14.1 17.5 18.2
Psychiatry PS 12.7 14.3 17.1 21.5 24.4 28.7 31.0
Anesthesiology AN 14.0 14.1 15.0 16.8 17.7 19.5 20.5
Pathology PA 12.2 14.1 16.4 20.7 23.0 27.4 29.7
Other OT 14.2 14.6 18.0 16.1 16.5 17.1 27.2
Total Tot 7.6 9.0 11.6 14.6 16.9 20.7 24.0
Year
Source: American Medical Association, 1986, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2005. Physician Characteristics
and Distribution in the U.S.  Department of Data Release Services, AMA: Chicago.  



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 4 (Continued).
Notes to Table 4. Regressions shown are pooled ordinary least squares on the sample
of new observations on physicians in the 1987 and 1991 Young Physicians Surveys.
(They do not include observations from the 1997 sample nor repeat observations in
1991 on physicians who were first interviewed in 1987.) Standard errors are Huber-
White robust and are shown in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by ** for p-
values less than 5% and * for p-values less than 10%. All models include controls for:
sex, age, race, region (northeast, south, midwest, west), a quadratic in experience, a
married dummy, a parent dummy, large specialty category (as listed in Appendix Table
1: general family practice, general internal medicine, specialty with no reported
subspecialties, medical subspecialty, general surgery, surgical specialty/subspecialty,
pediatrics, OB/GYN, radiology, psychiatry, anesthesiology, pathology, other), interaction
of the female dummy with the OB/GYN dummy, dummies for AMA membership and for
board certification, and practice setting dummies indicating private practice, a contract
arrangement, and salaried pay,  and  a  dummy for 1991.   Practice setting dummies are 
omitted in specifications that are segregated by contract arrangement. The base case
is a male physician in general practice in the Northeast in 1987. The models shown
in columns 2, 4, and 6 include a dummy for 1991 and the interaction of that dummy with
the following variables: female, OB/GYN, female*OB/GYN, the region dummies, the
married dummy, the parent dummy, and other specialty dummies. Column 2 includes
the interaction of the 1991 dummy with the contract arrangement variable. All dollar
values are in 1986 dollars. Models are weighted by weights designed to adjust for
differential response rates within the eligible sample across identifiable sample
subgroups and selection of an oversample of black and Hispanic individuals. These
weights were provided by the Principal Investigator. More detail on the construction of
these weights can be found in the codebooks for the data sets. Weights were made








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 7.  Percentages of Physicians in Contract Arrangements.
Year Men Women All
1987 37% 31% 35%
1991 53% 52% 53%
1997 88% 81% 87%
Notes. Percentages are calculated from YPS sample in each year.
Contract arrangement is defined as any HMO, PPO, or IPA contract.
54Appendix Table 1.  Medical Specialties.
Large Specialty Category Specialty
GP General Family Practice FP FAMILY PRACTICE
GP GENERAL PRACTICE
IM General Internal Medicine IM INTERNAL MEDICINE
SP Specialty with no reported subspecialties A ALLERGY









PM PHYSICAL MEDICINE & REHABILITATION
MS Medical Subspecialty CD CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASES
DIA DIABETES













GS General Surgery GS GENERAL SURGERY
SS Surgical Specialty/Subspecialty CDS CARDIOVASCULAR SURGERY
CRS COLON & RECTAL SURGERY












PD Pediatrics PD PEDIATRICS
OB OBGYN OBG OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY




PS Psychiatry CHP CHILD PSYCHIATRY
P PSYCHIATRY
AN Anesthesiology AN ANESTHESIOLOGY
PA Pathology FOP FORENSIC PATHOLOGY
PTH PATHOLOGY
OT Other OS OTHER SPECIALTY
US UNSPECIFIED
 55Appendix Table 2.  Numbers of observations in YPS, 





YYY 7 9 0
Y Y 662
Notes. Data are for Young Physicians Surveys, 1987, 1991, 1997.
Number 
of obs.
Data available in year?
56Appendix Table 3.  Oaxaca decomposition of log annual 
    income differentials.
A. Gender differential
= βm*Xm - βf*Xf
Year Sample Gender Differential specialty setting demographics
1987 All 0.33 no no no
1991 New 0.36 no no no
1991 Repeat 0.45 no no no
1997 Repeat 0.40 no no no
B. Portion explained by differences in characteristics
= β*(Xm - Xf)/ (βm*Xm - βf*Xf)
Year Sample uniform male female specialty setting demographics
1987 All 0.31 0.28 0.15 yes yes no
1991 New 0.33 0.28 0.27 yes yes no
1991 Repeat 0.26 0.21 0.10 yes yes no
1997 Repeat 0.25 0.16 0.14 yes yes no
1987 All 0.64 0.59 0.39 yes yes yes
1991 New 0.59 0.50 0.42 yes yes yes
1991 Repeat 0.55 0.43 0.46 yes yes yes
1997 Repeat 0.45 0.34 0.29 yes yes yes
Notes. Panel A: Each value shown in Panel A is the raw gender differential, i.e. the
coeffficient on the female dummy in the regression of log annual income on the female dummy
and a constant. Panel B: Each value shown in Panel B is the portion explained by differences
in characteristics, applying the same returns to characteristics for both men and women. The
columns show the use of uniform coefficients, male coefficients, and female coefficients
respectively. In panel B, three sets of characteristics are used: i) specialty dummies: dummies
for 13 large specialty categories as listed in Appendix Table 1; ii) variables for practice setting
(private practice, a contract arrangement, and salaried pay) and contract type; iii)
demographics: age, race, region (northeast, south, midwest, west), a quadratic in experience,
a married dummy, a parent dummy, number of children, hours worked per week, patients seen
per week, AMA membership, board certification, and malpractice claim ever. All regressions
are weighted by weights  designed to  adjust for differential response rates within the eligible 
sample across identifiable sample subgroups and selection of an oversample of black and
Hispanic individuals. These weights were provided by the Principal Investigator. More detail
on the construction of these weights can be found in the codebooks for the YPS data sets.
Weights were made uniform across the different years of data by a similar procedure. 
Controls Sample
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    Figure 1a. The market for female OB/GYN services, 























    Figure 1b. The market for female OB/GYN services, 










CS lost in waiting by 
patients due to fee rigidity 
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Figure 2. Percentage Female within      





































Source:   American Medical Association, 1986, 1992, 1996, 1999, and 
2005. Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the U.S.  Department of 
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    Figure 3. The market for female OB/GYN services, 
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